In July 2024, 33-year-old Chinese biologist Zunyong Liu is arrested at Detroit Airport. In his luggage, US authorities find illegal samples of the fungus Fusarium graminearum, a potential "agroterrorism" pathogen. The case shows that biotechnology – accelerated by artificial intelligence (AI) – is developing into the next key geopolitical technology, but also a dangerous one.
Countries around the world are struggling to balance innovation and security. After all, what enables medical progress can also create new risks for societies and economies. The challenge is to secure technological leadership without opening the door to misuse or uncontrolled dissemination of sensitive research results. An analysis by Dr Niclas v. Woedtke based on the "Biotechnology & National Security" panel at the Global Security and Innovation Summit 2025 in Hamburg.
The dual-use dilemma
Hardly any other field illustrates the ambivalence of modern science as clearly as biotechnology. Its tools – from genome editing to synthetic biology – are used to cure diseases, but can also be misused to develop pathogenic microorganisms or biological weapons. This so-called dual-use issue presents politicians, researchers and companies alike with new responsibilities.
Traditional control mechanisms – such as the EU Dual-Use Regulation or international non-proliferation agreements – are reaching their limits here. They were designed for an analogue world in which physical materials and laboratory processes could be verified. But in a digitalised research environment with cloud laboratories, open databases and AI-supported analysis models, sensitive information can hardly be controlled on a territorial basis anymore.
"The same technology that can combat pandemics can also create new threats. Our task is to address both sides of the coin legally and politically."
- Dr Niclas von Woedtke
AI × biotech: a new front line in security policy
The convergence of AI, automation and biotechnology is giving rise to new types of risks. Today, AI models can design genetic sequences, simulate laboratory processes or calculate protein structures – capabilities that were previously reserved for highly specialised research teams. Cyberattacks on genome data or automated production processes also open up a whole new field for espionage and sabotage.
The US is responding with industrial policy and security measures such as the BIOSECURE Act, which restricts investment in or the acquisition of biotech services from "high-risk countries". Germany is undergoing a strategic transformation with its "Zeitenwende" (turning point) policy, but its regulatory approach remains fragmented and shaped by the narrow European legal architecture. The EU, for its part, is working on a new regulatory framework with the planned EU Biotech Act, which aims to balance research and security interests.
Regulatory sandboxes: learning within the system
A key starting point is the concept of regulatory sandboxes – controlled experimental spaces where new technologies can be tested under real-world conditions but with clearly defined safety limits. Such learning, adaptive regulatory environments could become key to enabling innovation without weakening the safety architecture.
"Security is not a static concept, but a learning system. Regulatory sandboxes offer the opportunity to rebalance innovation and protection."
— Dr Niclas von Woedtke
The planned EU Biotech Act 2026 ties in precisely here – with the aim of creating innovation-friendly framework conditions while strengthening Europe's strategic autonomy in the biotech sector.
New security architectures for the bioeconomy
In the long term, there is no way around recognising biotechnology as part of critical infrastructure – and security as a guiding principle of innovation policy. Physical, digital and legal protection mechanisms must be interlinked. These include robust cybersecurity protocols, secure data rooms, international exchange mechanisms and the adaptation of existing non-proliferation agreements to technological progress.
The technologies that democratise biotechnology also open up new avenues for abuse. Only when states, companies and research institutions understand security as an integral part of innovation can the balancing act between openness and control be mastered.
Taylor Wessing supports players from the biotechnology, life sciences and high-tech sectors at the interface of law, technology and security.
